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Abstract 
The paper provides analysis of conceptual background of the trade credit insurance in 
the world. We analyzed briefly the problems, arising in insurance markets due to asymmetric 
information, such as adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Also we discuss the main 
stages of development of trade credit insurance in countries worldwide. Using comparative 
and graphical analysis we provide a brief evaluation of the dynamics of claims and recoveries 
for both short-term and long and medium term trade credit insurance in the world. For this 
purpose we used data on claims paid and recoveries for the period of 2005-2015. We found 
that the claims related to the commercial risk for medium and long trade credits in recent 
years exceed the recoveries, while with the political risk the reverse trend holds.  
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I. Introduction 
At the current stage of development of international trade the indirect promotion of 
cross-border trade in goods and services becomes increasingly important. More than three 
quarters of all transactions are accomplished with credit instruments. International practice 
includes different tools for supporting the participants of trade. Since the protection is 
perceived as the main reason to use appropriate instruments, the widespread instrument is the 
financial support in the form of trade credit insurance in order to cover risks, occurred during 
transactions. The presence of different risk factors in international trade gives evidence of the 
necessity of support in gaps that may affect exporters’ activity. 
In order to maximize the trade volumes and in the same time to minimize the exporters’ 
risks the stakeholders use trade credit insurance, which could be regarded as an important tool 
to manage the risk of delaying payments or a failure to pay.  
Since in transition economies this instrument of facilitating international trade is not a 
frequent practice, in order to elaborate some practical guidelines aimed at improving the 
financial support of exporters it is expedient to consider some conceptual issues of trade credit 
insurance as the widespread instrument of mitigating risks in international trade.  
So, the purpose of the paper is to provide analysis of conceptual background of the trade 
credit insurance in the world. It will also focus on brief analysis of the dynamics of claims and 
recoveries for both short-term and long and medium term trade credit insurance. To do this 
we structured the paper as follows. Section 2 reviews theoretical and empirical research on the 
insurance markets and trade credit insurance. Section 3 provides brief theoretical background 
of trade credit insurance, its history, benefits and disadvantages and examines briefly the 
problems in insurance markets occurred due to asymmetric information. Section 4 analyzes 
the dynamics of claims and recoveries for both short-term and long/medium term trade credit 
insurance in the world. Finally, Section 5 presents some concluding remarks. 
 
 
 
 
II. Literature review 
Some part of existing research studies the theoretical aspects of trade credit insurance in 
the globalized world, and the problems of insurance markets such as adverse selection and 
moral hazard. 
In their famous work “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the 
Economics of Imperfect Information”, Rothschild & Stiglitz [1976] examined incomplete 
competitive markets with imperfect information, focusing on the insurance market. They 
developed a model which showed that existing market equilibrium consists of contracts which 
specified both prices and quantities. 
Dewit [1996a] examined incomplete insurance markets with adverse selection and trade 
opportunities. She argued that subsidizing a public insurance system could be regarded as the 
second-best policy aimed to remove inefficiencies on incomplete markers. Moreover, such 
policy could lead to a trade creation.  
In her another work “Export Insurance Subsidization: Risk Coverage, Strategic Export 
Promotion or Aid?” (Dewit [1996b)] she investigated government export insurance 
subsidization as a way of strategic export promotion. Notably she investigated the provision 
of export insurance under asymmetric information in the insurance market with oligopolistic 
behavior. The author concluded that when only constrained coverage contracts are offered and 
there are information asymmetries, the simple state intervention rule is no longer effective.  
Gianturco [2001] investigated the role of export credit agencies (ECAs) and their 
financial impact on international trade, notably by examining their history and functions and 
making conclusions about their contribution to national development and economic growth. 
Baker [2003] examined the U.S. system of international trade finance including the main 
financial and credit institution such as the U.S. Export-Import Bank, the Foreign Credit 
Insurance Association, the Public Export Funding Corporation which insure trade credits and 
facilitate country’s trade. Riestra [2003] examined the development of credit insurance in 
European countries in order to determine its possibilities and constraints, notably for small- 
and medium-sized companies. Gomez [2004] compared both American and Brazilian models 
of export credit insurance. As a result, he found some similarities in the policy-making and 
regulatory boards and certain differences concerning the operational agents. 
Ascari [2007] examined main factors of changing the export credit insurance business 
model. He found that actual strategies of export insurance companies diverge from traditional 
models in order to become a global financial player in the international markets. Einav & 
Finkelstein [2011] analyzed both theoretical and empirical work on adverse selection in 
insurance markets, notably its implications for allocation of insurance, social welfare, and 
public policy. Cuñat & Appendini [2012] studied the trade credit and its role in financing of 
small and medium businesses, taking into account the problems of transactions costs, 
imperfect competition, incomplete markets, adverse selection and moral hazard.  
Van der Veer [2015a] studied the impact of claims on the both availability and price of 
export credit insurance. The obtained results allowed him to conclude that the global trade 
credit insurer could shift extreme loss shocks across countries worldwide by temporarily 
reducing its export credit insurance supply. Yalcin [2015] examined an impact of bilateral 
investment treaties and their insurance as a tool of protection of foreign investors. 
Empirical research estimating the impact of trade credit insurance on trade flows and 
economic growth is generally provided for selected industries, countries and regions, where 
such influence could be perceived as significant. 
Panagaria [2000] investigating the case for export subsidies argued that in most 
practical situations the removal of tariffs (free trade) could be regarded as a superior policy. 
Also he investigated the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection, by concluding that 
this is not a reliable reason for government intervention. The study of practical experience of 
India, Brazil and Mexico allowed him to conclude that in India export subsidies have little 
impact on exports while in Brazil and Mexico export subsidies were a wasteful tool to 
promote export diversification.  
Olivella & Vera-Hernández [2008] tested the hypothesis of adverse selection on private 
health insurance markets. Notably, they supposed the correlation between risk and the 
probability of taking private insurance under adverse selection and symmetric information. 
And they found evidence of adverse selection in the British private health insurance market. 
Sandström [2008] examined the relationship between political risk and international debt 
defaults. In order to test hypothesis that country-specific political risk factors cause 
constraints for debt repayment, both when the export credit is extended to public institutions 
or to corporations, she used data of export credit guaranteed debt contracts of Finnish 
exporters and foreign counterparts in 145 countries worldwide.  
Shi et al. [2012] studied adverse selection in insurance markets with information 
asymmetry where beneficiaries differ in the degree of risk aversion and riskiness. They tested 
empirically their theoretical model using observations from major Singapore’s automobile 
insurer. The regression model allowed them to conclude about evidence of asymmetric 
information in this market.  
Auboin & Engemann [2014] examined the impact of trade credit on trade on a macro 
level. They used data on trade credits for the period from 2005 to 2011. Using econometric 
techniques they identified positive impact of insured trade credit on trade. Furthermore 
authors found that this impact is very strong and stable over the whole cycle, remaining 
steady both at crisis and non-crisis stages. Manova & Yu [2014] investigated the impact of 
financial frictions on China companies’ choice between ordinary trade and processing, and 
also how could such decision affect firm’s performance. They found that such credit 
constraints could induce economic agents to conduct more processing trade and could prevent 
them from developing higher value-added activities. 
Sözen et al. [2014] analyzed the problem of possible adverse selection on the export 
credit market in Turkey. They developed credit risk model for 1114 SMEs that take direct 
credits from Türk Eximbank within the period from 2003 to 2008. As a result they found that 
some specific sectors were oversupported by the Bank directly, that allow them to conclude 
about information asymmetry and adverse selection problem on the export credit market. Van 
der Veer [2015b] using econometric techniques examined a relationship between private 
export credit insurance and trade. He used panel data, notably, the value of exports insured, of 
world’s leading private trade credit insurers from 25 exporting countries to 183 destination 
ones for the period of 1992 to 2006. As a result he found that that private export credit 
insurance affects trade (trade multiplier) to a greater extent than the value of exports insured. 
Kerer et al. [2016] studied the credit insurance in African countries, namely Morocco, Ghana, 
Uganda and Madagascar in the framework of intention of German government to increase its 
engagement in agricultural finance in Africa. 
 
III. Theoretical background 
The experts of the World Bank determine trade credit insurance as an “insurance policy 
and risk management product that covers the payment risk resulting from the delivery of 
goods or services” [Jones, 2010, p. 3]. Trade credit insurance aims to protect the accounts 
receivable of economic agents from losses occurred as a consequence of non-payments of 
their debtors. Also it could cover losses resulting from such risks as war and civil disturbance, 
nationalization, expropriation etc. 
Since the premiums are generally charged monthly, they are calculated either as the 
percentage of sales of given month or as a percentage of receivables outstanding. It should be 
noted that this type of insurance insure only the risk of firms, not of individuals and the 
premium rate reflects the average credit risk of the insured portfolio. The trade credit 
insurance could also cover single large transactions.  
According to A Guide to Credit Insurance [2015] issued by Euler Hermes, the largest 
provider of trade credit insurance in the world, trade credit insurance “is a business insurance 
product that protects a seller against losses from nonpayment of a commercial trade debt” [A 
Guide to Credit Insurance, 2015, p. 2]. 
The short-term trade credit insurance usually covers trade transactions having terms of 
repayment of one year or less. Medium- and long-term trade credit insurance includes 
insurance for transactions for more than one year (generally, from 3 to 5 years) [Auboin, 
2014, p. 5].  
A standard trade credit insurance policy cover all receivables, while specific account 
insurance could apply to certain group of customers or to selected transactions. But such 
policy typically does not include the trade between affiliates of MNC, the trade between 
government departments and agencies. Also at present day the activity of trade credit insurer 
is accompanied by credit management services and excess loss cover, when insurer covers the 
risk of exceptional default payments [Riestra, 2003, pp. 2-3]. 
According to Euler Hermes [2015] estimations, the trade receivables could represent 
from 30% to 40% of a supplier’s balance sheet. This means that economic agents face risks of 
financial difficulties occurred due to the buyer late or non-payment. Notably, 25% 
insolvencies of suppliers in the European Union are occurred due to these reasons [Euler 
Hermes, 2015, pp. 9-10]. 
In insurance markets the widespread is the problem of asymmetric information, since 
certain participants are informed better about situation on the market. The adverse selection 
occurs before the transaction is accomplished when economic agents are more informed about 
their risks, about probability of a loss etc. than the insurers. The situation of moral hazard, as 
a type of information asymmetry, appears after the transaction occurs, when insurance 
companies are not able to observe perfectly the actions of insureds and as a result they are 
dissuaded from providing the protection that would be ensured in a market with perfect 
information. 
The problem of asymmetric information is larger for the developing countries than for 
developed ones for two reasons. First are the difficulties in obtaining the information. Second, 
the instruments designed to protect the counterparties may not be available as required 
[Sokolovska & Sokolovskyi, 2015]. Insurance and credit markets and ratings are less 
developed, thereby complicating the acquisition of information in order to prevent an adverse 
selection situation. Also the provision of insurance and credit services is often limited by a 
non-developed legal system, complicating the contract enforcement. That, in turn, limits the 
use of collateral aimed to reduce moral hazard [Fingerand & Schuknecht, 1999, p. 4]. 
Fig. 1 presents the classic case of adverse selection in the insurance market. 
Marginal cost curve has a downward slope. This reflects the adverse selection property 
of insurance markets: individuals who want to pay the most for coverage have the highest 
expected cost. The demand curve reflects the willingness to pay for insurance. 
The risk premium is shown graphically in the figure as the vertical distance between the 
MC curve and the demand curve. The demand curve in theory is always above the marginal 
cost curve, since the risk premium is always positive. This means that the demand curve is 
efficient for all economic agents to be insured (Qeff = Qmax), i.e. the efficient allocation is 
defined by relationship between demand and marginal cost, and that is the reason of arising 
the inefficiency occurred due to adverse selection. At the same time the equilibrium allocation 
could be determined between demand and average cost. In the case of adverse selection the 
average cost curve lies above the marginal cost curve and intersects the demand curve at a 
point less than Qmax. As a result the equilibrium quantity will be less the efficient one (Qmax) 
and the equilibrium price (Peq) will be less than efficient price – the situation of under-
insurance. 
 
 
Notes: D – demand curve; MC – marginal cost curve; AC – average cost curve 
Source: [Einav & Finkelstein, 2011] 
Figure 1. Adverse selection in the insurance market 
 
In such case the cost of welfare will depend on the lost surplus (the risk premium), of 
economic agents who will remain inefficiently uninsured in the competitive equilibrium, i.e. 
whose willingness to pay does not exceed the equilibrium price, Peq. As a result, the total 
welfare loss from adverse selection in this example can be determined by the area of the 
deadweight loss trapezium EFGH [Einav & Finkelstein, 2011, pp. 116-119]. 
The insurance theory generally determines two main types of insured risks in 
international trade: commercial risk and political risk.  
Commercial risk is the risk of failure of the buyer to fulfill its obligations (contractual 
payment) due to insolvency or bankruptcy. According to A Guide to Trade Credit Insurance 
[2015], political or country risk is “the risk that a government buyer or country prevents the 
fulfillment of a transaction or fails to meet payment obligations in time” [Guide to Trade 
Credit Insurance, 2015, p. 171]. Short-term trade credit insurance typically covers both 
political and commercial risks. 
Van Dijk [2012] determines also fabrications risk, which means that the supplier is not 
able to deliver the goods and services due to circumstances of the buyer of these goods. 
A Guide to Trade Credit Insurance [2015] determines additionally conversion or transfer risk, 
which could be considered as a sort of political risk, also contract risk, post-shipment risk, 
pre-credit risk etc.  
According to EU experts [2012] trade credit insurance has its own characteristics, which 
distinguishes it from other classes of insurance. First, the claims tend to follow the business 
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cycle. In general, this is typical for commercial risk claims. Second, the claims paid do not 
coincide with losses. In some periods claims could exceed the insurer’s recoveries. This is 
typical for political risk claims. Third, the costs of administration are higher than for most 
other types of insurance due to both labour intensive process and costs related to minimization 
of losses and recovery work [Study on short-term trade finance…, 2012, pp. 5-7]. 
A bulk of research determines three main alternatives to trade credit, which could be 
used for mitigating the credit risk. Table 1. summarizes benefit and disadvantages of trade 
credit insurance and its most common alternatives. 
 
Table 1. Trade credit insurance and its main alternatives in the insurance market 
 Letter of credit Factoring Self-insurance Trade credit insurance 
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It is a bank’s 
agreement, which 
guarantees to the 
supplier the payment 
of a buyer’s 
obligation for the 
amount due with the 
specified terms and 
conditions.  
Only provides 
coverage for a single 
transaction with a 
single buyer 
The risk is beared by 
the bank, not the 
buyer 
Prefinancing 
the suppliers 
by financial 
institutions 
(factors), 
which pay a 
percentage of 
the face value 
of a trade 
receivable to 
the supplier.  
Creation of 
backward debt 
reserves aimed to 
cover losses 
occurred due to 
the default of 
receivable 
outstanding. As a 
an indicator firms 
could use the 
percentage of 
sales, past loss 
experience, 
percentage of 
overall 
receivables etc. 
Protection companies’ 
accounts receivable from 
losses occurred due to 
different risks 
A
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The payment is 
guaranteed by the 
bank.  
Giving security to 
both the supplier and 
the buyer. 
Reducing the 
production risk. 
The payment is 
guaranteed by 
factor 
Giving to a 
company an 
immediate 
access to cash  
 
Requiring the 
internal resources. 
Maintaining 
direct relationship 
with customers. 
Covering any 
type of loss 
Transfers of risks. 
Ensuring the sales growth 
and expansion into 
international markets. 
Receiving better financing 
terms. 
Reduction of backward 
debt reserves. 
Prevention suppliers from 
liquidity shortages or 
insolvency. 
Improving the borrowing 
power due to including the 
foreign receivables into 
the borrowing base. 
Providing an access to the 
insurer’s expertise. 
Providing the stability and 
reduction the volatility of 
earnings  
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Expensiveness (fees 
and interest). 
Sensitivity to the 
foreign currency 
fluctuations. . 
Need to be cash 
secured (typical for 
developing markets). 
Increasing the 
transaction costs. 
Reduction the 
buyer’s borrowing 
capacity 
Lack of 
control. 
Aversion of 
some 
companies to 
deal with a 
“third-party” 
Expensiveness 
(two types of 
costs: a service 
charge – a 
percentage of 
sales factored, 
and an interest 
charge for the 
cash advance 
loan).  
Absence of fixed 
premium cost 
every month.  
No risk spreading.  
The absence of 
detailed statistics, 
generally 
provided by 
insurers.  
The insufficiency 
of accumulated 
funds in order to 
cover 
large and 
unexpected 
catastrophic 
losses 
Presence of specific 
coverage limits, other 
exclusions or limitations 
on coverage. 
Exclusion of foreign 
accounts from coverage 
(typically) 
Requiring the detailed 
periodic reports from the 
supplier. 
 
 
There are another tools for trade credit insurance such as alternative risk transfer (ART), 
which is mostly reserved for MNC and not for credit risks cash in advance (this is not a 
common method in international trade), bank guarantee, documentary collection. 
The main difference between letters of credit and trade credit insurance is the 
responsibility of the buyer, but not the supplier, who requests it from the bank. Approximately 
70% of exported goods and services in America are traded through letters of credit. He argued 
that the company’s decision to choose whether factoring or trade credit insurance depends 
from desirable level of coverage and the size of the firm. Notably, large companies will not 
choose factoring, while the small companies will seek for factor’s services in order to do not 
dedicate their own resources to these functions. Also, when a company has a large number of 
low-value invoices and, respectively, the large number of clients the factoring could be an 
appropriate tool in order to mitigate the risks. At the same time the company with a small 
number of clients and high-value invoices will choose trade credit insurance as the cheapest 
tool [Riestra, 2003, pp. 12-13].  
Zurich American Insurance Corporation [2013] distinguishes four main types of trade 
credit insurance programs. They include the following. 
1. Whole-turnover policy under which the insured agent is required to cover its 
customers. Such policy, in turn, is divided into two types: excess-of-loss or non-cancellable 
underwriting philosophy (for large companies) and Ground Up or cancellable philosophy (for 
SMEs). 
2. Key Account Policy which is designed for economic agents who intend to insure only 
their key accounts.  
3. Single Buyer Policy, proposed for company, having disproportionate exposure unit 
comparing to the rest of its customers; 
4. Top Up Policy, under which the insured company uses a secondary carrier services in 
order to cover excess of limits of the primary buyer [Companies turning to Trade Credit 
Insurance, 2013, pp. 3-4]. 
So, a trade credit insurance policy allows economic agents to be secured and to increase 
their sales on open account terms. It provides the competitive advantage to export traders, by 
ensuring the different trade credit insurance program, which can be adapted to certain 
conditions.  
Let’s briefly examine the history of trade credit insurance in the world.  
The trade credit insurance practices appeared in the Mediterranean, after the Napoleonic 
wars in order to guarantee safety and payments in trade. The first insurers appeared in large 
ports such as Venice, Livorne, Naples and Gênes [Riestra, 2003, p. 14]. But, according to 
Jones [2010] the first trade credit insurance techniques were established by the British 
Commercial Insurance Company in 1820 in order to provide both fire and life coverage 
[Jones, 2010, pp. 4-5]. 
In the present form, the trade credit insurance established at the end of nineteenth 
century, and after it was developed in Western Europe between the World Wars (table 2). 
 
Table 2. Countries, established trade guarantee and insurance schemes and programs 
Countries Period Rationale 
Switzerland  1906 To reduce unemployment and 
to stimulate the trade  
United Kingdom 1919 
1921 – First Guarantee 
Scheme  
1926 – Second Guarantee 
Scheme 
1930 – Credit Insurance 
Scheme. 
1933 – The Comprehensive 
Contract 
To reduce unemployment and 
to stimulate the trade 
To cover both political and 
commercial risks in trade 
Belgium 
Denmark 
the Netherlands 
Finland 
Germany 
Austria, Italy 
France and Spain 
Norway 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
To reestablish export trade 
To recover industries after the 
World War I  
To facilitate exports to the 
Soviet Union 
Japan 
Czechoslovakia, Latvia, 
Poland 
Sweden 
Ireland 
1930 
1931 
1933 
1935 
To keep up trade flows after 
worldwide economic 
depression 
To maintain both output and 
employment 
the United States 1934 Export Import Bank 
started to offer different 
guarantees similar to trade 
credit insurance. 
1961 – Foreign Credit 
Insurance Association(FCIA)  
To reduce the political risks 
and partly the commercial 
risks. In 1964 the FCIA took 
the commercial risks entirely, 
reinsuring them at Export 
Import Bank 
Berne Union – International 
Union of Credit and 
Investment Insurers 
1934 To encourage cooperation 
among national trade credit 
insurers. 
To exchange information on 
clients and countries. 
To improve the level of 
competency in insurance 
techniques of member 
countries 
Mexico 1937 – Banco Mexicano de 
Comercio Exterior 
(BANCOMEXT) – the first 
trade credit insurer in a 
developing country 
To finance trade with North 
America and Europe  
Japan, Germany, Italy, 
Austria 
Late 1940s – early 1950s To restore exports  
To assist in reconstruction 
after the World War II 
South Africa  1956 – the first African trade 
credit insurance program 
To finance trade with Europe 
and Asia 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Korea, 
Pakistan, Peru, Portugal 
1960s To extend business activity 
and to increase employment 
To improve international 
competitiveness 
To increase exports flows 
To strengthen the balance of 
payments and the dynamic 
export growth industries 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, 
Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
1970s 
Egypt, Indonesia, Tunisia, 
Turkey 
1980s 
Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and 
other countries 
1990s 
Source: [Jones, 2010; Krauss, 2011; Riestra, 2003; van Dijk, 2012] 
 
At present the trade credit insurance remains a specific area of non-life insurance. 
During the 1990s, three groups – Autraduis, Coface and Euler Hermes accounted for over 
85% of the global credit insurance market, i.e. this market is highly concentrated [Jones, 
2010, p. 4]. 
In early 2000s, in Europe, trade credit insurance activity represented on average only 
1% of non-life premiums. This indicator differed by country. For example, UK with high 
penetration rate for non-life insurance, had a relatively low credit insurance indicators, while 
Spain, having average rates of non-life credit insurance, ranked at the top for trade credit 
insurance. Due to EU regulations related to the privatization of short-term trade credit 
insurance, the premiums were increased substantially [Riestra, 2003, pp. 14-15]. 
The U.S. is now regarded as developing market for trade credit insurance products, 
since historically insured preferred other types of trade risks insurance, such as letter of credit. 
But the increased risks in cross-border transactions lead to the increase of the demand of trade 
credit insurance. So, the trade credit insurance is a new concept for the U.S. insurance market, 
notably in non-life insurance area. Now Eximbank plays a crucial role in this market, by 
proving coverage to small business and to companies dealing with higher risk countries 
[Companies turning to Trade Credit Insurance…, 2013, p. 2].  
 
IV. Empirical analysis 
Let’s analyze the situation with claims and recoveries in the countries worldwide. For 
that we used data provided by Berne Union for the period 2005-2015.  
Fig. 2 presents the dynamics of claims paid and recoveries for the short term trade credit 
insurance. 
 
 
Source: [Berne Union Statistics. 2008-2013; Berne Union Statistics. 2011-2015; Berne Union 
Yearbook 2009] 
 
Figure 2. Dynamics of claims and recoveries for short-term trade credits  
for 2005-2015 
It can be observed that every year, except 2006, the claims paid exceeded recoveries. 
From 2005 to 2009 and from 2011 to 2015 claims paid for short term export credit 
transactions have been gradually increased, reflecting mainly the growing business volumes. 
This indicator returned to its normal value in 2010 and 2011 after peak in 2009. One of the 
main reasons of such unusual increase of claims paid was the Arab Spring.  
According to Berne Union [2014], the highest volumes of claims paid for the short term 
export credit insurance per country in 2014 resulted from defaults in Iran ($191 million), Italy 
($186 million), the United States ($145 million), Brazil ($143 million), and Spain ($108 
million). It should be noted that many export credit agencies in the world have been affected 
by losses in Ukraine. In 2014 they resulted from defaults in Venezuela ($173 million), USA 
($165 million), Italy ($110 million), Brazil ($90 million), and Russia ($76 million). 
The peak of recoveries was reached in 2006; they were made from Algeria and Russia. 
Despite that in 2009 the claims paid were more than doubled the recoveries remained 
unchanged. 
The next step is to analyze the dynamics of claims and recoveries for medium and long 
term trade credit insurance. For the analysis we divide the mentioned indicators for those 
related to the commercial risk (Fig. 3) and to the political risk (Fig. 4) respectively. 
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Source: [Berne Union Statistics. 2008-2013; Berne Union Statistics. 2011-2015; Berne Union 
Yearbook 2009] 
 
Figure 3. Dynamics of claims and recoveries related to the commercial risk  
for medium and long trade credits for 2005-2015 
 
 
Source: [Berne Union Statistics. 2008-2013; Berne Union Statistics. 2011-2015; Berne Union 
Yearbook 2009] 
 
Figure 4. Dynamics of claims and recoveries related to the political risk  
for medium and long trade credits for 2005-2015 
 
During the start of world financial crisis in 2008 one could observe the prevailing of 
commercial claims, related to liquidity shortages. But in 2009 the situation has been changed 
focusing on the political risk. In 2011-2011 the balance between commercial and political 
claims was disrupted due to situation in Iran and North Africa, notably in Libya. The 
following increase of commercial claims relatively to political ones in 2010-2014 occurred 
due to economic deterioration of debtors, growth of privatization in emerging markets and to 
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a devaluation of certain currencies. But in 2015 political claims occupied 54,3% of claims 
paid for the medium and long term trade credit insurance while the share of commercial 
claims was 45,7%.  
According to Berne Union [2014], one of the most important reasons of dominance the 
commercial claims on political ones during the last 15 years was the transformation processes 
in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Hans Janus, Member of the Board at Euler Hermes 
Deutschland Aktiengesellschaft, stated that “Political risk lost its dominance for credit 
insurers and in particular the currency conversion and transfer risks disappeared entirely as a 
consequence of the abolition of currency controls in most of the countries” [A history of the 
Berne Union, 2014]. 
It could be observed that in 2005-2008 MLT claims paid have been gradually 
decreased. The peak of MLT recoveries in 2005-2006 occurred due to large amounts 
recovered from Algeria, Nigeria and Russia. In 2009-2012 both MLT trade credit and 
political risk insurance claims have been increased due to deterioration of macroeconomic 
situation in many countries. This had a special impact on commercial claims.  
Berne Union [2015] considers that the highest amounts of claims paid for the medium 
and long term trade credit insurance per country in 2014 were due to defaults in Iran ($916 
million), Russia ($296 million), Ukraine ($187 million), USA ($172 million), and Kazakhstan 
($97 million). 
It should be noted that the situation differs from country to country. For example, 
debtors in Iran faced difficulties to effect payments abroad due to sanctions. In Russia claims 
paid were affected by low prices for energy and mining resources. The number of claims in 
Ukraine is directly related to the geopolitical conflict and weakness, as a result, of national 
economy.  
 
V. Conclusion 
We briefly consider some conceptual issues concerning the trade credit insurance in the 
world. The provided analysis allowed us to determine that in now in international trade 
relations is rather difficult to operate without possibility of spreading the risk in order to offset 
partially the impact of losses. We also determine the main instruments of mitigating risks in 
international trade, their benefits and drawbacks. The expensiveness and transaction costs are 
the essential disadvantages of alternatives of trade credit insurance. Transactions in the 
insurance market are often affected by asymmetric information, which in turn lead to 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. We define that the essential reasons of 
introduction the trade credit insurance schemes in countries worldwide are re-establishing and 
developing the export trade, especially after geopolitical conflicts, improving the international 
competitiveness, strengthening the balance of payments.  
Using both comparative and graphical analysis we provide an evaluation of dynamics of 
claims and recoveries for short-term and long and medium term trade credit insurance in the 
world. We found that over the last years the claims paid on short-term trade credit insurance 
exceed the appropriate recoveries and that trend holds. This is mostly related to the growing 
business volumes. The claims related to the commercial risk for medium and long trade 
credits in recent years exceed the recoveries, while with the political risk the reverse trend 
holds. The identification of reasons for such trends, which would help to improve the 
insurance support of exporters, will be the direction of future research. 
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